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Abstract
Research Summary: The recent electoral popularity
of populism suggests our understanding of global and
domestic institutions and their impact and relevance to
international business may require adjustment. In par-
ticular, the literature may be omitting key variables as
to what the political environment entails. We propose a
framework for understanding the differing varieties of
populism. We examine what channels populist thought
operates through and how various strains of populism
concentrate on different facets of society. We articulate
an operational definition for international strategy
based upon prior research in economics, political sci-
ence, and history. This framework is incorporated into
current research on institutional theory as applied in
international business, with the goal of proposing a
more nuanced and foundational view of institutional
environments and how they impact global strategy.
Managerial Summary: The surge of populism
globally—but especially in developed economies—has
highlighted new perils for business strategy. Our current
models of strategic thinking have not yet caught up to
the reality of populism's moment, nor have they accu-
rately captured what are increasingly important facets of
a political system, such as traits of specific leaders. This
paper examines the need to incorporate new perspectives
on institutions into global strategy. In particular, we
highlight the various varieties of populism—whether it
focuses on economic, social, or political ends—and how
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each approach can impact a business in a different man-
ner. In doing so, we provide some clarity and guidance
for managers faced with political turbulence.
KEYWORD S
environmental uncertainty, political institutions, political risk,
populism
1 | INTRODUCTION
Although populism is a phenomenon stretching back to the 19th century, the last half-decade has
seen the uniquely rapid ascent of a variety of populist leaders into positions of significant power
around the world, most prominently represented in Donald J. Trump's victory in the
U.S. presidential election in 2016 and the vote of the British public to exit the EU (Brexit). The popu-
list wave had been building well before Trump's surprising victory and Brexit, as populists first
moved into power in large developing countries, typified by Vladimir Putin in Russia (in power since
2000), Xi Jinping in China (in office since 2012), and Recep Erdogan in Turkey (since 2014). What is
occurring today has parallels in the past and fits with scholarly political logics applied in various
fields (see, e.g., Bonikowski [2017] and Hawkins, Read, and Pauwels [2018] as examples of the
expanding literature speculating on the “whys” of the recent rise of populism). But unlike previous
episodes of populist success, the current wave has not been discriminatory and has encompassed
developed as well as additional developing economies; moreover, populist approaches have been
widely variegated and encompass several different varieties of populism, with different leaders focus-
ing more on economic, social, or political aims. This rise in populist electoral success more broadly
has led to considerable speculation as to why populism has gathered momentum at this point in
time and in a manner that appears to span continents and different forms of government.
The upsurge in populist political parties, to the point of their achieving power (either individ-
ually or in coalitions with other parties), is a key feature of the current political environment
and appears to be so for the foreseeable future, and as such will have important ramifications for
country institutional structures. And this wave, variegated in its aims and purpose, has direct
and important consequences for global strategy. Indeed, given the fact that the latest wave of
populism has stretched over so many diverse countries, multinationals and domestic firms
appear to be equally at risk. However, it is this very diversity that bedevils our analysis of popu-
lism's effects on strategy, as there is a highly contextual and country-specific context in addition
to the global wave. Previous episodes of policy and institutional shifts can provide guidance as
to: (a) how we might theoretically and practically understand implications for business, and
(b) if, and what, we might need to do to adjust our current global strategy and international busi-
ness theories to incorporate the reality of the form of populism we are seeing today. But these
lessons can only apply if we diagnose the challenges which business face correctly.
In this paper, we argue that there are varieties of populism, with populist parties and ideas
across the globe which may be pro- or anti-globalization, pro- or anti-immigrant, and pro- or
anti-market (or even hold some halfway and mutually contradictory combinations of both or
any of these). To hold to a singular view of populism would thus be misguided and potentially
dangerous, in that it could lead incorrect strategic decisions by managers and policy makers,
with strategy based on a lack of understanding of the individual political actors and how they
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are operating in, and making use of, the institutions with which they interact. For example, the
common refrain seen in the popular press points to disaffected groups left behind by the march
of globalization as driving the current wave of populism; for example, the left-behind towns of
the Northern UK and the mid-western United States. In addition, the rise of social media, “fake
news” and informational echo chambers have reinforced unsubstantiated and biased view-
points (as well as the role of Russia and other states in attempting to assert or re-assert their
authority by undermining the democratic process of other states, as shown in, e.g., Bunde,
2017; Economist, 2017a; Elliott, 2017; and Swanson, 2017). Each of these different possible
drivers may lead to very different populist policy prescriptions.
The broader point we wish to make in this paper is not necessarily about populism in and of
itself. In fact, by contrast with others in this special issue, this paper thus takes the existence of pop-
ulism as a given; we specifically do not seek explain the why of this surge, leaving it to others to
explore the forces of globalization and marginalization that drove it forward. Instead, we delve into
the varieties of populism and its academic study over time in order to explore its relevance for global
strategy and argue for a deeper, more microfoundational, and theoretical approach toward institu-
tions and institutional environments. Importantly, from the standpoint of the global strategy and
international business community, we argue that the rise of populism in all of its varieties points to
a weakness in our understanding of global and domestic institutions and their impact and relevance
to international business. The institutionalist literature has contributed greatly to our knowledge of
external environments and their impact on firm behavior and strategy. However, the vast majority
of academic studies in international business that look at institutions uniformly do so from the
standpoint of faceless institutional structures rather than the idiosyncrasies of individual actors
using institutions for their own (and their supporters') ends. What the rise of populist leaders—and
their various approaches toward governance—implies is that we may need to rethink how we char-
acterize institutional structures and look at an increasing role for the individual players in the politi-
cal game, particularly when socio-political institutions are more malleable. In this sense, we are
hinting that we may need something more akin to a mixture of microfoundational logics and upper
echelon theory that accounts for not just what the institutions are and what their ostensible func-
tion is, but how they are used and how they evolve based upon who holds the institutional levers.
In short, who is the leader matters beyond ideology and institutional structure, an insight which is
self-evident in political science but has been glossed over in economics and international business.
In what follows, we propose a tentative framework for understanding the nature of populism
as well as articulating an operational definition for international business based upon prior
research in economics, political science, and history. We incorporate this framework into current
research on institutional theory as has been applied in international business with the goal of pro-
posing a more nuanced and foundational view of institutional environments. Such a view will help
us to understand the possible effects of populism on businesses, and how such institutional changes
may alter the landscape that both domestic and multinational corporations face in the future.
2 | WHY POPULISM AND INSTITUTIONS MATTER IN
STRATEGY
2.1 | What is “populism”?
One of the fundamental challenges to the study of populism is the lack of a single, all-
encompassing, and widely accepted definition of what populism actually is. Part of this
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challenge comes from the fact that many scholars from many different disciplinary back-
grounds have given their voice to the populist debate, each favoring an interpretation that is
drawn from their own theories and evidence base. In addition, the topic has exploded onto the
intellectual and popular agenda quite quickly. As Rooduijn (2019) points out “Populism is sexy.
Particularly since 2016… In 2015, The New York Times used the terms ‘populism’ or ‘populist’
671 times. One year later, that number had doubled to 1,399. And in 2017, the newspaper
employed these words 2,537 times… The increasing appeal of populism is also reflected in aca-
demia. … [I]n 2010 ‘only’ 76 articles had been published with the words ‘populism’ or ‘populist’
in the title. In 2015 this number had increased to 155, in 2016 to 208 and in 2017 to 332.” Con-
comitant with this popularity is the lack of clarity in what is meant by populism and how it dif-
fers depending on the field and purpose of the author (see, e.g., Macauley, 2019). Roger Cohen
(2018) has gone so far as to argue “Let's do away with the word ‘populist.’ It's become sloppy to
the point of meaninglessness … Worse, it's … applied to all voters who have decided that main-
stream political parties have done nothing for their static incomes or disappearing jobs or sense
of national decline these past two decades. ‘Populism’ is a dismissive term for everything metro-
politan elites can't quite find the energy to understand.”
For our purposes, we utilize Rode and Revuelta's (2015) definitional structure which
describes populism as a conglomeration of ideology, tactics, and strategy. In particular, they
note four distinct varieties of populism, differing by their concentration across these three
dimensions: structural, economic, ideological, and political-institutional. Table 1 provides an
overview definition of these varieties along with some key references, which we summarize
below.
The structural approach, perhaps the oldest conception, focuses particularly on the “social
origins of the regime,” seeing populism as an attempt to form “large cross-class coalitions to
implement a reformist set of policies that are supposed to catalyze economic development,
without producing explosive social conflict” (Rode & Revuelta, 2015: 75). By contrast, the eco-
nomic definition, while sharing the idea of social origins of institutions, identifies economic
populism as a group of policies which “promote short-term compromise and income redistribu-
tion among interest groups, frequently at the expense of productivity growth and long-term
prosperity” (Guillen, 2000: 365). Juxtaposed against these two definitions, the ideological school
asserts that populism is based on simplified representations “pit[ting] a virtuous and homoge-
neous people against a set of elites and dangerous ‘others’ who are together depicted as depriv-
ing (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity
and voice” (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008: 3). Similarly, Hawkins (2009: 1042) defines popu-
lism as discourse, where politicians (in his example, the late Hugo Chavez) associate “good with
a unified will of the people and evil with a conspiring elite.” Finally, the political-institutional
approach is drawn almost exclusively from the political science literature and focuses on politi-
cal institutions, party organization, and particular mobilization strategies that populist move-
ments utilize in order to enact their anti-elite policies or prejudices (Levitsky & Roberts, 2011;
Roberts, 1995; Weyland, 2001). The political-institutional framing, more than any other
approach, gives emphasis to the role of leaders and their charisma in making populism palat-
able to the masses (a logical extension given the emphasis on democratic processes). For exam-
ple, Barr (2009: 44) explicitly defines populism as “a mass movement led by an outsider or
maverick seeking to gain or maintain power by using anti-establishment appeals and
plebiscitarian linkages.” Fukuyama (2014) make an even bolder claim, noting that charismatic
leaders have the ability to displace long-standing institutions, eroding them by force of
personality.
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While Rode and Revuelta's (2015) structure allows us to define the varieties of populism
across a set of dimensions, it does not automatically allow us to determine when a leader or
party is appropriately labeled as a “populist” in a pure and strict sense. Indeed, it is important
to emphasize that populism is best understood both dimensionally as a specific variety and
across a spectrum where leaders/parties are more or less populist (a) in comparison to other
parties and leaders and (b) on specific dimensions.
2.2 | Intent of the populist agenda
Each of these perspectives of populism yields valid insights for how to characterize populist
leadership and thus to understand its possible influence on business. In reality, the path toward
populism can be found in a country's institutional system (but only to a point) and, in particu-
lar, the way in which a country's existing political institutions mediate the rise of populist
leaders (or create a propensity to populism). In addition, as Fukuyama (2014) hinted at, it is
crucial to understand how populism can change a country's institutional structure, altering the
rules of the game. By examining the actual intent of the populist agenda in a particular country,
we can begin to see how its institution-shaping abilities can reverberate to change business
strategy (see Figure 1).
There appear to be at most three major areas of intent behind populist agendas, each of
which can carry serious ramifications for firms (Table 2 matches these areas of intent with
TABLE 1 The varieties of populism
Variety of
populism Description Relevance for strategy Key papers
Structural Populism as a social call to arms
using large-scale cross-class
coalitions
Emphasis on favored
factors of production,
stress on local and
domestic value chains
Cardoso and Falletto
(1979); Taguieff (1995);
Rode and Revuelta (2015)
Economic Populists exploit the fears of the
least economically secure
segments of society, those who
may be more receptive to a
policy of scapegoating elites,
immigrants, the rich, or any
number of “the other”
Review of investment
policies under
uncertainty, proactive
policies to avoid possible
nationalization,
diversification of value
chains
Dornbusch and Edwards
(1990); Weyland (1999,
2001); Madrid (2008);
Inglehart and Norris
(2016)
Ideological Populism conceives of society as
representations of good and
evil, superimposed onto the
political process of a particular
country
Need for strategic
flexibility depending on
variety of populism.
Albertazzi and McDonnell
(2008); Stanley (2008);
Hawkins (2009); Mudde
and Kaltwasser (2017)
Political–
institutional
Populism is a sustained, large-
scale political project which is
meant to mobilize
marginalized social classes into
political action
Need to cultivate new
political connections,
serve new demographics
Roberts (1995); Weyland
(2001); Jansen (2011);
Levitsky and Roberts
(2011)
Source: Varieties based on Rode and Revuelta (2015).
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actual populist leaders to understand how they operate in practice). In addition, the definitional
character of the populist agenda, intent and mode of operation, given in the column linking
Tables 2 to the definitions of populism in Table 1, reveal that most populists use different mix-
tures of populism based on their context and intent with some—such as U.S. President Donald
J. Trump and former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi in the case of the Economic defi-
nition and Xi Jinping in the case of the Ideological definition—relying on a singular characteris-
tic that does not put basic structures under as much threat as when they are used in
combination with the Structural or Political-Institutional characteristics that we see being
applied in the case of more radical populists—such as Robert Mugabe, Evo Morales, and Juan
Peron. What is important to keep in mind is that while some populist leaders are closer to
archetypes for the specific forms of populism—for example, Orbán in Hungary or Berlusconi in
Italy as reflecting something close to pure economic populism and Xi Jingping of China as
indicative of something close to pure ideological populism—we see almost every variant and
there is nothing to imply that any mixture could be excluded. What we do not see (at least yet)
is the ultimate uber-populist that embodies every form available. This may reflect the fact that
there are micro-level conflicts between the forms and their operationalization that imply that it
is politically more expedient to pick an appropriate mixture of the varieties of populism
available.
2.2.1 | Power acquisition
The first, and most immediate, goal of populism and populist policies may be the acquisition of
power, either directly for a charismatic leader or in coalition with other related political groups
(de Castro & Ronci, 1991). While such a goal can be inherently self-serving—that is, a leader
seeks his glory and not necessarily populist ends—acquisition of power via elections can also be
seen as a necessary step to returning power and voice to “the people” (Albertazzi & McDonnell,
2008). It is also in many ways the easiest step in that it does not require the actual management
and delivery of political and social promises, at least at the outset, as a simple narrative can suf-
fice to be elected (although not always). Moreover, given the adversarial approach which
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populist thinking ascribes to society in general, acquisition of power is important in its own
right as “the opposing party no longer appears as an enemy to be destroyed, but rather as an
adversary with whom we compete for the temporary acquisition of democratic power (Abts &
Rummens, 2007: 419).” A populist agenda can also be commandeered by an existing party for
this very reason (as with parts of the Republican party's embrace of Trump or with Conserva-
tive's courting of UKIP voters over Brexit), espousing specific populist policies to garner support
but without a concrete world-view on overall redistribution or smashing current elite
institutions.
With seizing power as the goal of a populist party, the channels of influence on business
would seem to be relatively straightforward. In the first instance, firms aligned (implicitly or
explicitly) with the populist party may be rewarded (for example, with government contracts),
while those seen as opposed sidelined or even explicitly disadvantaged. Additionally, the uncer-
tainty surrounding the populist drive for power and the prospects of success can affect firm
investment decisions or even consumption patterns, leading to shifts in consumer demand. This
can result in sectoral reallocation, changes in firm valuation, and other supply-chain issues
which can directly impact a firm's bottom line. Indeed, this appears to be one of the major
points of shock with respect to the reduced power of MNEs in effecting policy in the United
States and the power of local and global economics surrounding Brexit.
2.2.2 | Remaining in power
Beyond merely seizing power, the intent of populism may be to perpetuate it (in this sense,
there is nothing unique about populism versus any other political philosophy). The retention of
power is a goal which can be reached in three distinct yet similar ways. The easiest way for pop-
ulists to retain power is to deliver value to specific constituencies either through the extraction
of rents—for example, via nationalization of the commanding heights of the economy—or via
redistribution of these same rents—for example, via social policies, payments, or other trans-
fers. Characteristic of many modern populist states, this approach is also favored by more
authoritarian leaders who have greater capacity to undertake such policies. Putin's Russia is the
best example of this, as it has been powered by constant redistribution of rents amongst favored
constituents or oligarchs as political winds demand it. Such policies have also found favor
amongst democracies (a sample of which can be seen in Table 2). For example, Argentina's
Cristina Kirchner and Brazil's Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva used both avenues to solidify their grasp
on power. As Aytaç and Önis¸ (2014) note, Kirchner increased the Universal Child Subsidy and
cash transfers covering 30% of the population under the age of 18 (a similar policy was under-
taken in Poland by the ruling PiS party, see Appendix A), while at the same time nationalizing
the private pension system and re-nationalizing the national airline and the country's largest oil
company. This has obvious consequences for firms operating in these sectors, as well as sup-
pliers and upstream/downstream industries, as MNEs in the United States have found with
respect to Trump's trade war with China and immigration policies (Maidment, 2018).
Unfortunately, this approach is limited in its ability deliver a “permanent” populist consen-
sus, as the policies of redistribution contain the seeds of their own demise; especially in a
democracy, as Kirchner and Lula da Silva discovered. Crucially, as populist policies generally
do not increase the size of the rents available in society but merely shuffles them around, there
is a hard budget constraint on how many constituents can be bought off. And as Cardoso and
Helwege (1991) note, the need to pay for the redistribution often results in macroeconomic
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instability and disastrous inflation when this budget constraint is reached, as has been seen in
both Venezuela and Zimbabwe. Macroeconomic instability and especially macroeconomic cri-
ses wreak havoc on firm planning, projections, and often lead to the demise of firms on the
margin (Bhattacharjee, Higson, Holly, & Kattuman, 2009).
Cardoso and Helwege (1991) also make another important point in passing regarding the
unsustainability of this approach, mainly that populist redistribution is usually not to the
poorest segments of society but rather to favored and well-connected insiders; such a reality cre-
ates a new elite class who are then themselves vulnerable to new populist messages and leaders.
In this way, the exploited become exploiters, finding that the only way to keep power is to instill
fear of opposition to the populists (as seen in Robert Mugabe's land expropriation in Zimbabwe
or the Chavez/Maduro repression in Venezuela—at least until recently). In terms of effects on
the firm, this also increases the need for political savvy on the part of business, in order to
remain in the good graces of the “correct” elite (Li, Meng, Wang, & Zhou, 2008; Wu, Wu, &
Rui, 2012). Indeed, as Potter (2018) shows the nature and mixture of political lobbying of the
Trump administration has changed, with the power of industry groups being more strongly
contested by the power of special interest groups represented by NGOs.
The second way in which power can be perpetuated via a much more sustainable route (one
more suited to democracies) is by expanding the political coalition dedicated to populism. For
populism to matter, it needs a vector to power, which can be obvious, such as the violent sei-
zure of power during a revolution or a coup d'état, or subtler, such as the working through the
democratic process, either via elections or more direct instruments such as referenda (Figure 1).
In order to perpetuate power in a democracy, the strategic populist uses populist policies to
bring more people into the political system, seeing such expansion as a way to wrest control
from established elites and ensure sustainability of these policies. An example of such a tactic
occurred in Brazil in its revolution of 1924, where military officer Luís Carlos Prestes tried to
overthrow an order he saw as corrupt and in which expansion of the political base would
undercut both the industrialists of the cities and the power barons in rural areas (Duff, 1967).
In many ways, former U.S. President Obama was also a populist who attempted to draw in dis-
affected minorities to create a new political alignment, expanding the base of minorities to lock
in populist redistributive policies (Dreier, 2009). In other cases, appeal to nationalism has
broadened the populist coalition (as shown in Table 2): Vladimir Putin has been particularly
effective in using Russian nationalism to promote his domestic agenda, while in the case of Chi-
nese President Xi Jinping, there is a clear nationalist theme being followed that emphasizes the
Chinese independence and the role of the state in enhancing the living standards of ordinary
(mostly urban) Chinese.
In this manner, populism is perpetuated not as a simple transfer scheme, but as a way to
erode or change existing institutional structures from within, using the levers of democracy to
forever alter its composition and shape. However, for this approach to work, populist ideas
must also have value to voters as well, and the peddlers of populist policies—if they are to
achieve a significant role within existing institutional structures—require a degree of popularity
in sufficient form to achieve power (history is littered with unpopular populists). There is a gulf
between being “populist” and merely being “popular,” although similarities do exist, and one is
often (but not necessarily) seen concomitant with the other. For example, Bukowski (2011: 13)
notes, there are similarities between populist politicians and adolescent peer groups, with popu-
lar leaders of both being “fashion conscious, prominent, gregarious, and see[ing] themselves as
serving positive ends.” The “selfless” devotion of either the head “mean girl” or Donald Trump
is, thus, only rightly rewarded with popularity and a recognition that it is not easy being the
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queen bee or the President of the United States (and thus they have to make sacrifices to better
serve their followers). In this sense, in the mind or the ego of the leader, there is a nexus
between populism and popularity, with populist policies undertaken in order to perpetuate
popularity.
It is here that populism's reality as “thin ideology” (Stanley, 2008) is helpful, as it allows
populism to be used as a tool in service of other, better-developed ideologies from both the left
and the right. A malleable populism, drawing on prevailing winds often simply manifests itself
as anti-whoever-is-in-power; a strategy that can be quite successful (Mudde & Kaltwasser,
2017). Indeed, variants of populist thinking that emerged in Central Europe in the 1990s mar-
ried business liberalism with nationalist goals (Hanley, 2004). In Thailand, an overtly pro-
business Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra instituted populist policies while simultaneously
attempting to secure business growth for favored insiders (Phongpaichit & Baker, 2005). In both
of these cases, populist leaders were reacting against previous rulers but taking their cues on a
stance toward business from the “will of the people.” Thus, the effects on business can be con-
tradictory and not always easy to discern without understanding the specific leaders involved.
But even if an opinion or policy is popular there may be limits to which a polity will go to
see these policies actually enacted. Normal democratic processes, especially in a parliamentary
democracy, do not always lend themselves to populist ideas seeing the light of day—even if
these ideas are popular—unless they are able to work initially within the institutional structure
that exists. The most recent classic example being President Trump's attempts to get funding for
a Southern border wall through the U.S. Congresses budget making process. Additionally, a
country's political institutional make-up will also influence the political goals of the populist
agenda, thus playing the role of a key determinant of the effect of populism on business.
There are many political institutions which can help to prevent populism from becoming
policy, not least of all the type of system and/or other formal organizations associated with
political institutions (for a further explication, see the Appendix A). One of the key formal polit-
ical institutions playing a blocking role against populism is the formal party mechanism, a polit-
ical seal of approval and organization without which populist ideas can remain in the ether
with no hope of becoming policy. In the past, established parties either countered or co-opted
the populist agenda sufficiently to negate its long-term influence, a trend which continues
today. For example, the Swedish Democrats were not included in the government despite win-
ning 14% of the vote in the 2014 election (the third highest total) and 17.5% of the vote in 2018
(again third highest), while the Greens, with only 6.9%, are part of a minority coalition with the
Social Democrats because of an agreement not to cooperate with the Swedish Democrats by all
other parties. Moreover, in the United States, it would be hard to see the populism which
Donald Trump or Bernie Sanders espouses surviving with a third-party; it was only the Republi-
can Party's eventual embrace of Trump, and the jettisoning of some of its long-held tenets (such
as commitment to free trade) which enabled Trump to succeed.
However, the effectiveness of existing political institutions in preventing populism from hav-
ing a vector to power is not iron-clad. The experience of the past decade has shown that formal
institutional barriers to entry are by no means prohibitive, and one of the striking aspects of the
latest wave of populism is just how this institutional hurdle has been overcome. Indeed, parties
such as the UK Independence Party (UKIP), AfD or the Dutch Party for Freedom (Partij voor
de Vrijheid, PVV) have overcome organizational challenges to become serious contenders in
the political arena. To this extent, the drivers of populism are an important part of the equation,
as what we have seen is the underlying pressures behind the populist agendas have been suffi-
ciently strong to overcome political structures that have historically kept them out of power.
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2.2.3 | The long march through institutions
Thus, the third, and most radical, way in which power can be perpetuated is to co-opt
established political institutional frameworks in pursuit of populism, changing existing political
institutions so that they are less of a barrier and more of a facilitator. The weaker the checks
and balances on the execution of the power of the executive, the more likely that those pursuing
a populist agenda will be able to capture all levers of government once in a position of power.
The goal of such capture would allow a leadership that might not generate broad support for its
populist policies to reduce the likelihood that the policies would be thwarted or negated by
either other populists, mainstream politicians, or the administrative bureaucracy of the state
(what Trump supporters call the “Deep State”). This was seen in the case of Erdogan's purging
of the Turkish judiciary in 2017 (Economist, 2017b) or the Sandinista's strategies to control of
the judiciary in Nicaragua from 2007 onward (Schmidt, 2009) and was argued by some to be
President Trump's strategy in slowing appointments and inducing resignations within Executive
Department administrations in 2017 (Friedland 2017) and using “acting” appointments to avoid
Senate scrutiny and the entrenchment of powerful cabinet members. Similarly, control of state
institutions allows for increasing the likelihood that that the coalition of internal powers—polit-
ical, social and military—that led to the leadership currently in place continue to be satisfied.
The deposing of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe in 2017 after 37 years in power was an example
where a populist leader lost hold of key constituencies within the power structure, despite
maintaining strong poll numbers and being seen as quite popular personally.
A change of political institutions can engender the largest amount of uncertainty and, at the
same point, effectively change the rules of the game going forward (Hartwell, 2018a). If the for-
mal party system is abolished and one-party rule is instituted, then political connections
become crucial for nearly every form of business decision (Boubakri, Cosset, & Saffar, 2012);
moreover, given that firms tends to associate with other politically like-minded firms (Stark &
Vedres, 2012), the disruption of carefully cultivated inter-business networks may also have a
severe disrupting effect on firm operations. This also may skew firm operations into the political
marketplace rather than the actual marketplace (Yang, 2006).
3 | RETHINKING INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE IN
GLOBAL STRATEGY THEORY AND IDENTIFICATION
What we have argued in the prior section is that there is no single way to characterize populism
but that we can outline its purposes and vectors of influence and the different definitions align
with different “Varieties of Populism”. Although invariably portrayed as being at the extremes
of the political philosophical spectrum, it can comfortably exist as an ideology on either the left
or right and, in some sense, all political leaders and parties have some degree of populism even
though they are not labeled as “populist” or as part of a “populism” wave. However, the extent
of the success of more extreme populist parties and leaders in terms of political outcomes is
related to the degree in which they possess the appropriate breadth and depth necessary to
achieve power within the institutional structure of the polity in question. Moreover, populism
may only succeed as an ideology if its policies are themselves not co-opted by the existing politi-
cal and institutional structure; in this sense, populism may use existing institutions to come to
power but must have the force of will to then change those institutions (this was the case with
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George Wallace in the 1960s and 1970s, where the Republican Party shifted to accommodate
his mostly White Southern supporters).
This “force of will,” we argue, comes not just from the institutional imperatives which either
constrain or enable populism, and there is considerably more nuance in the characterization of
institutional structures than merely their form. Indeed, institutions must be considered holisti-
cally in terms of their actors and positioning within an institutional system; examining institu-
tions absent the individuals that occupy positions of political and administrative authority leads
to mischaracterization. This perspective is hardly new or unique, as the idea of political actors
as simply drones who operate the political system without influence has been widely discredited
in the political science literature. Huntington (1965), for example, shows how political institu-
tions can be hindered simply by changes in leadership and Hartwell (2013) reveals how the per-
sonalities and backgrounds of post-communist leaders are shown to matter for economic
outcomes.
What is telling is the degree to which the extant literature to date in economics and interna-
tional business has downplayed this aspect of institutional structures; for example, assuming
that it was the office that mattered and not who occupied that office (Appendix B provides a
detailed examination of this fact). If we examine Hall and Soskice's (2001) characterization of
the “Varieties of Capitalism” and the difference between coordinated market economies and
liberal market economies, we see how our viewpoint brings into question such a dichotomous
view of institutional reality. Varieties of populism have taken root in both liberal market eco-
nomics (e.g., the United States and United Kingdom) as well as coordinated market economies
(such as Germany, Austria, Italy, and Sweden). It has taken root in authoritarian quasi capital-
ist states (e.g., Russia and China). It has embedded itself in both developed and developing mar-
kets (e.g., Brazil, Argentina, and India). All told, what this implies is that a mistake in our
thinking has been to focus too much on categorization of institutional regimes—however, logi-
cal such ex ante categorizations appear to be—rather than how those regimes can be used by
political actors to achieve political ends. In fairness to Hall and Soskice (2001), their emphasiz-
ing aspects of institutional complementarity as key to effectively economic and social outcomes
is worth keeping in mind as a lever of political implementation. However, it still abstracts from
the fact that ultimately if the outcome that is aiming to be achieved is something better, we
need to understand the “to whom” that “something better” matters and how the gains and
losses are distributed across the society and the globe. For Hall and Sokice, the goal is achieving
and maintaining “Comparative Advantage”; to many populist leaders this is simply one means
to their own personal goals and their constituency.
What the rise of populism implies is that researchers in international business potentially
should be paying more attention to both structure and “content,” where the “content” is the
nature of the controllers of the institutions. Overall, we find that no article in IB has focused on
individual political actors. This is not meant to be overtly critical (much can be explained by
other factors that this literature examines), but it is indicative of the fact that what has inter-
ested international business and global strategy scholars most has been firm- and country-level
factors and not the managers of institutional power. They are simply viewed as rather colorless
implementors and potentially minor influencers of political law and its interpretation – passen-
gers in a driverless car, if you will. In this regard, we would argue not only that the hierarchy of
agency of political decision making is important but so too is the process by which decisions are
made. While we have a process theory of internationalization that addresses how and why
firm's make the decisions they do, we abstract from the processes by which other key actors are
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making decisions that impact on the decisions of firms. This amounts to not just the who these
decision makers are but the structures in which they operate.
Given the reality that levers of power and influence are but one aspect of institutional struc-
tures (and who takes advantage of those levers and how they use them/to what end they are
applied matters), we argue that the literature has potentially over-emphasized the importance
of macro-level risk in previous work. Currently, we focus on aspects of formal institutions
(e.g., veto points, nature of elected representation, or an independent judiciary), informal insti-
tutions (e.g., administrative implementation, culture, religion, openness, or corruption), and
micro-level risks that target specific aspects of business (e.g., intellectual property, importing
restrictions, specific regulations, or transfer pricing rules). While the literature has downplayed
the micro risk – but which has still been studied in a number of contexts, particularly intellec-
tual property (e.g., Khoury, Cuervo-Cazurra, & Dau, 2014) and in the attempt at MNEs to gain
legitimacy (e.g., Bucheli & Salvaj, 2018), we would argue that, more importantly, our concep-
tion of institutions does not account for the nature of the political marketplace and the philoso-
phy, intent, and strategy of the political actors responsible for such outcomes.
One question that would certainly arise with respect to this perspective is the extent to
which such an approach would be relevant (or realistic) for understanding the theoretical or
empirical problems that global strategy scholars address. We are not necessarily advocating a
form of political Kremlinology, where discerning the motives of political actors is crucial to
understanding institutional functioning because, again, institutions can and do operate inde-
pendently of their leaders (albeit to different degrees). Instead, we advocate that leaders do in
fact play a role, a reality not dissimilar to the “do managers matter?” debate; that is, do we need
to know what managers are thinking to understand, forecast and evaluate what firms are doing
(Aharoni, 2010; Devinney, 2011). We assert that adding a “do politicians and political managers
matter?” level to many of our theoretical formulations and empirical models is important for
three reasons.
3.1 | Institutional persistence
First, what is clear with respect to the examples we have used in this article, is that the overall
political (and economic) institutional environment in most situations and in the vast majority
of countries has not changed dramatically in the last several years as a result of populism. As of
this writing, there have been no large-scale fundamental political institutional changes in the
United States, China, Europe, United Kingdom, and the other countries discussed, a reality that
can be traced both qualitatively and, via the use of aforementioned databases, quantitatively.
Indeed, historically, short of revolutions, natural disasters and major upheavals, political insti-
tutions change slowly, their semi-permanence being one of the attributes that makes them
“institutions,” (Hartwell, 2015; Scheidel, 2017). The example of the border wall battle in the
United States between President Trump and a House of Representatives controlled by the Dem-
ocratic Party shows how resilient institutional structures when they are deeply embedded and
long lived (Ganesh, 2018). Where we have seen institutional change is after the populist has
gained power, a fact consistent with our logic here. This is seen in changes in the Polish
Supreme Court – where a mandatory retirement age of 65 was instituted by PiS—the constitu-
tional changes made by Erdogan in Turkey, and Xi Jinping's becoming leader for life. It should
be noted that this has not occurred in the United States under the Presidency of Donald Trump.
For example, while he may be able to influence the philosophical direction of the Supreme
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Court, the structure of the institution has not, and will not, change. Similarly, his decisions on
NATO, the Transpacific Partnership, and so forth, are all within the normal decision-making
structures of the Constitution as it has evolved to this point.
What does change more quickly, and what can constitute a “major upheaval,” is the envi-
ronment in which those institutions operate and, crucially, who occupies the decision-making
authority within those institutions. Or, in the case of many administrative rules in Donald
J. Trump's administration, the lack of an occupant in the role or the role being occupied by an
interim administrator loyal to the President. With a charismatic leader or party espousing popu-
list ideas, policies may be put in place that can have longer-term consequences in effecting insti-
tutional change via either erosion or evolution (so-called Type II policies). Hence, what matters
to studying institutions longitudinally—where perhaps the major source of variance is, espe-
cially over the short-term—is who occupies (and has occupied) the administrative or political
thrones. What this implies is that knowledge of the past and country context also can determine
a country's proclivity to populism. This is also seen in how the definitions of populism apply to
specific political actors. Going back to Tables 2 and 3, we integrated the different definitions of
populism with the specific populist leaders. What is clear from that exercise is not just that each
actor's populism is of a mixed form, but that for many populist leaders there are long term moti-
vating factors that cannot be captured just by looking at when the change itself is instituted or
appears. In many of the cases where a populist leader or party gets into power, there is a
“latent” populist sentiment that operates and is only “realized” is specific contexts. Hence, we
potentially lose sight of the important aspects of a necessary condition for a populist upheaval
to occur.
This matters cross sectionally as well: if we look at aggregate scores for measures such as
Polcon and Polity IV, we see very little variation between EU countries or most developed West-
ern nations, yet they vary dramatically in terms of policy based on the nature of their govern-
ment or governments in place at the time. Similarly, China's administrative system has hardly
changed over the past two decades, yet the governments of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao and Xi
Jinping could hardly be more alike. At the opposite extreme, it seems not to matter who is the
Prime Minister of Singapore, not only because their institutions are more constraining but
because the generation of leadership changes has simply perpetuated individuals with a similar
philosophy of government and governance (a comment on the closed nature of the political sys-
tem and the incentives doled out by political institutions).
3.2 | Distribution matters
Second, we put great stock on the role that economic institutions play globally and in inter-
acting across borders, particularly in the expansion of global openness and trade. Yet what we
have seen in the last decade is that what matters is not the average level of gain coming about
from globalization (i.e. the effectiveness of economic institutions) but the distribution (actual or
perceived) of gains and losses (i.e., the effectiveness of political institutions). While there are
few to no countries that have materially lost, on average, due to increased global integration,
there is a spatial dimension within countries where significant differences between winners and
losers emerge. This was perhaps more noticeable in the case of the United Kingdom, where the
North–South divide and that between Scotland, Wales, and England is quite significant. Simi-
larly, the role that Northern Ireland plays in British politics has been exacerbated because of
the power of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) being the key to continued parliamentary
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control for Prime Minister Theresa May. While we as researchers empirically rely on static mea-
sures for institutional structures, the reality is that distributions do matter, spatial or otherwise.
Some countries have institutional structures that are more stable because they are ironclad and
rigid (for good or bad reasons and outcomes), while others have very malleable institutions that
bend considerably as the political, social, and environmental winds blow. This is true at both
the macro and micro level. Our research assumes that two countries with identical institutional
measures, however estimated, are effectively equivalent. Hence, just as current research on cul-
ture has changed to look at the spatial distribution of existing measures, perhaps it is time to
take a more time dependent regional or district focus on the nature of political orientation
(e.g., Beugelsdijk, Kostova, & Roth, 2017).
3.3 | Looking beyond the nation-state
Finally, as noted by Devinney (2011), the prevailing institutional thinking is distinctly Westpha-
lian, and as a consequence, researchers focus on institutional structures within the boundaries
of nation-states. This orientation is conceptually and practically logical; conceptually, institu-
tional structures are bounded by country borders, shaped by country history, and (for the most
part) are generalizable across entire countries; practically as well, our data tends to be available
only at the country-level. However, even domestic political institutions can have cross-border
effects and institutional change in one country can spillover to neighbors or around the world
(if the circumstances are ripe): the spread of communism and fascism can be thought of as such
an institutional contagion, one where institutional change in one country made it more likely
in another (Hartwell, 2018b). In many ways, the current populist wave is one that clearly has
contagion-like characteristics, with the success of extreme right and left parties in one political
environment influencing and encouraging others, also providing newcomers with lessons on
how to be successful in gaining or influencing political power. Donald Trump's election cer-
tainly had influence in many ways, perhaps the most important being that his 24/7 media pres-
ence has legitimized populist groups in other countries. Similarly, the Brexit vote, unlike other
anti-EU vote outcomes in places like Ireland and the Netherlands, has given life to many groups
disenchanted by the EU. Whether this pushes these political parties into power is immaterial in
the short-term, as the event itself has affected the policies and positioning of the mainstream
parties.
The high-profile events of the past 3 years in the world's largest economies have highlighted
the need to have both broader and deeper theoretical and empirical models of institutions and
their influence. Particularly, our theories and empirical models need to account for, to use an
analogy, not just the make and model and year of the car but the driver as well. Brexit, Trump,
and other instances of populism have shown that our models right now are essentially models
of driverless cars.
3.4 | A conceptual and methodological agenda for future research
If there is a need to shift some of our institutional focus to leaders and personalities, it is crucial
to define how we can improve upon existing institutional theories (e.g., Peng, Wang, & Jiang,
2008) to integrate historical and socio-political factors into models of global strategy. From a
conceptual perspective, this paper has outlined a variety of factors to consider when looking at
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the nature and character of populist leadership, none of which are actually unique to populism.
The dimensions we outline in Figure 1 can easily be expanded to account for other aspects of
political/social philosophy (e.g., by expanding that “non-populist” part of the “Nature of Popu-
lism” dimension), while the dimensions of the “Acquisition of Power” and “Intent of the
Agenda” are completely generalizable. Hence, our position here is that the framework we have
outlined serves as a starting point for what would need to be examined more from a micro-
foundational, behavioral, and socio-political perspective. In this regard, upper echelon theory
(e.g., Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996) provides some guidance as to where we could begin to
work out a more nuanced aspect of institutional theory. Much of upper echelon theory concen-
trates on the observable “what” of the top management team (e.g., education, experience, etc.)
but behind this is a foundation based on how those individuals think and are motivated by spe-
cific beliefs. It is that foundational logic that matters here: What motivates political actors philo-
sophically and practically that would imply how they use or influence the levers of power?
Perhaps more interestingly would be the degree to which we think about institutions empir-
ically, an exciting area which has seen great strides in the past two decades.
3.4.1 | Continuing the quantification of institutions
First, we could try to simply expand the empirical characterization of existing model structures.
One way in which this could be done is to look at recent work on culture and how the variabil-
ity within country of cultural measures matters for institutional evolution (e.g., Beugelsdijk,
Kostova and Roth, 2017; Hartwell, 2017) or how a variety of our institutional measures vary
over time (e.g., Klein, 2017). What this approach does is essentially decompose cultural or insti-
tutional measures into a greater number of components than a headline metric, showing what
the composition of these sub-measures might be (e.g., rather than looking whether a judiciary
is independent one might consider the orientation or voting rules of that judiciary). This analy-
sis also can discern other trends in institutions, including, crucially, how the constituent mea-
sures of an institution might exhibit higher or lower degrees of variability (e.g., by including not
just mean measures but measures of variance or cyclicality). The benefit of doing this is that it
is reasonably easy to calculate based on existing data, making it a low-cost methodological inno-
vation. Similarly, such variability measures will also capture specific country context quantita-
tively (i.e., does this institutional change deviate from a trend), creating a tool for panel or
broader-based approaches beyond the case study method. However, as detailed in this paper,
the issue with such a tactic is that it ultimately still does not capture the role of the institutional
controllers, although they may reflect this in how those institutions are used in influencing
some instrumental measure. In this sense, it is a halfway house to a more microfoundational
approach to examining institutions and politics.
3.4.2 | Institutions versus environment
The second approach for empirically modeling institutions would a similar decomposition, but
not of institutions themselves; rather, this approach would explicitly separate institutions from
their environment and the model the interaction of the two. With regard to institutions, this
analysis would examine the degree to which there is the potential for variability in institutional
structures. For example, some databases include measures of administrative influence, in the
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sense that they indicate the degree to which bureaucratic latitude exists within a particular
institution. While the approach noted in the previous paragraph would develop measures of
general variance in the institutional environment at both the macro and micro level, this sec-
ond approach would be concentrated on potential variability rather than realized variability. By
focusing on the potential for institutional volatility, one could account for the extent to which,
should a political party or leadership of a specific type capture power, they can alter the policies
related to the institution(s) in question. This approach too would allow for capturing country
context, previous leaders, and what previous policies contributed to a country's institutional
structures. Similarly, these types of measures could also be developed for the population at large
to examine the extent to which political opinion is malleable or to which policies can be
aligned. Although some such measures along these lines exist, they are estimated on the vari-
ance in the population, rather than on variance within the individual. The logic behind this
methodology is more in line with that proposed by Devinney and Hohberger (2017) with
respect to culture, where they argue that one gains more understanding by characterizing indi-
viduals as having their own variability rather than focusing on the variability across individuals.
But both levels of analysis are necessary because the likelihood of a policy occurs at the nexus
of what the polity would view as acceptable with the ability to align (or bend) the political
instruments of power to those viewpoints (hence generating both popularity and the probability
of maintain political power). In either case, developing such a methodological approach would
require new conceptual bases as well as new methods of measurement and estimation.
3.4.3 | Bringing leadership in
The third approach is the most difficult but also the one most closely aligned to the populist
phenomenon and how it is situated in our framework. As shown above, it is necessary to exam-
ine the cognitive and socio-political models of the individuals in positions of power to under-
stand institutional dynamics at any given point. At a macro level, this might be related to the
schemas employed by the leader or leadership group or an analysis of statements, platforms,
and pronouncements to understand heuristics which may arise. To some degree, this approach
would be a more generalized form of Kremlinology, but with the aim of creating a structured
way of characterizing a broader variety of political environments (which may not comport with
simple left/right classification). Advancements in text analysis have allowed for analysis along
these lines, with political scientists increasingly using the words of politicians to understand
political institutions and political conflict (Grimmer & Stewart, 2013). Unfortunately, at the
micro level such an analysis is more complicated, as the leader or participants in specific insti-
tutions dominate rather than any over-arching logic behind their schema; moreover, there is
less of a public record than with large, visible institutions such as government, meaning likely a
bias toward such visible institutions. A distinctly micro-foundational approach would necessar-
ily require more information as to the specific political or administrative players in an institu-
tion, requiring an even deeper knowledge of the local context and forcing us back to case
studies rather than broader cross-country work. Whereas, in the macro case, we might be able
to look at Donald Trump and the broader Republican establishment to understand political
institutional structures in the United States, in the micro case what would matter are the indi-
vidual members of the executive leadership team, their CVs, and their actions in the past.
The last point does not imply that more macro, national level, approaches to understanding
populism and political institutions are invalid. For example, we would agree with Mudambi's
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(2018) characterization of the macro national-level drivers of what makes populism a potential-
ity in a society. Where we would differ is in focusing not on the potentiality of a populist politi-
cal regime—which gets at the question of some of the “why-is-this-occurring” type of issues—
but at the mechanics of “how” it happened, which is related country-specific factors such as the
distribution of interests (such as why Williams Jennings Bryan failed and Donald J. Trump
succeeded), how it potentially can be, or has been, maintained, and what the role of the individ-
ual members of the leadership are or were (the “who” controls the levers of power).
A partial example of the possibility of focusing on more micro aspects of political leadership
is seen in the V-Dem Institute and how they have used expert opinion as a means of measuring
democratic institutions. Indeed, their approach was one of the first major indicators of the
decline of democratic political processes in a number of countries, including the United States
(see, e.g., V-Dem, 2018). More narrowly, the Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index (https://
populismindex.com) focuses exclusively on a prescribed list of populist political parties. Most
recently, The Guardian newspaper funded an academic group, entitled Team Populism (https://
populism.byu.edu/), that has text analyzed the speeches of ‘leaders' in 40 countries looking for
populist rhetoric and relating this to a host of socio-economic variables—such as income
inequality, taxation, corruption and so on. While the analysis is somewhat limited, the data is
very comprehensive and their analyses are informative in highlighting the extent to which pop-
ulists in power impact the economic and political system (see, e.g., Ruth-Lovell, Doyle, & Haw-
kins, 2019). Although all these approaches, to date, concentrate mainly on macro issues and do
not specifically measure leader characteristics, they use experts to subjectively evaluate each
country's formal and informal institutional structures, capturing the more contemporaneous
changes in orientation which could be influenced by the sorts of pressures and effects we have
been discussing in this article (Coppedge et al., 2018).
There is also considerable scope for a revitalization of co-evolutionary thinking with respect
to political actors and socio-political institutions. While co-evolutionary models are not new
and have been applied in the case of MNEs and local political institutions (Cantwell, Dun-
ning, & Lundan, 2010) generally and also in the case of specific examples (Dieleman & Sachs,
2008), the dominance of cross-sectional research and a willingness to assume political
stationarity as the norm has led us to under-emphasize the endogenous nature of political, eco-
nomic, and social change. This is important in both democratic politics, where policy entrepre-
neurship, policy opportunism, and the process of policy development, institutional formation,
and policy implementation are important (Weissert, 1991), but also in developing markets,
where the variety of choices of the direction of policy and the structuring of institutions are
evolving quickly in real time in many instances (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2015). The role of specific
political actors cannot be underestimated in key areas where the potential policy alternatives
are large, or the structure of the political system allows for rapid changes of direction based
upon who holds the levers of power. In this regard, it is not the diversity of institutional struc-
tures that matter but their malleability in the hands of political managers.
Finally, there is an issue that would never have been anticipated by those responsible for
the development of the institutional and political theories we apply today, the role of social
media. It relevance today, based on how it has been co-opted more successfully by those pursu-
ing a populist agenda than those from the political mainstream, simply cannot be under esti-
mated in a world where the U.S. president communicates mostly in 140- or 280-character
chunks. This requires more meaningful integration of the role and used of media into global
strategy thinking, particularly as it applies to governments and institutions at the micro-
foundational level, where the issue of the control of communication matters significantly. As
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Foucault (1991, 2002) notes, there is an inter-weaving of knowledge and power (his notion of
power-knowledge) and how you structure information is the source of power. We see this in how
populists have used language and how Donald Trump has masterfully controlled the daily news
feed. For example, Patterson (2017) found that Trump received more media coverage than every
other candidate in the 2016 in nearly every week of the campaign—effectively neutralizing cam-
paign spending by his opponents. Also, Trump has been masterful in his use of social media to neu-
tralize his opponents (witness his reliance on easily understood labels, such as “crooked Hilary,”
“Pocahontas,” “Failing New York Times,” etc.) while both motivating his base and increasing the
productivity of those who would be his allies, both locally and abroad (which explains why Trump
comments on what appear, at times, irrelevant issues in other countries). Patterson (2017) shows
that nearly 42% of all news media time in his first 100 days in office was taken up by discussions
relating to Donald Trump, with a significant amount of it related to his early morning tweets.
4 | VARIETIES OF POPULISM AND MANAGING IN AN AGE
OF POPULISM
4.1 | Observing the varieties of populism
We have noted throughout this article that the public perception of populism does not reflect the
variety of different populist agendas (Tables 2 and 3) nor the fundamental political and social
motivation of populist leaders and their parties (Tables 1–3). In addition, we have emphasized
the fact that looking for a singular definition of populism is fraught with fallacies and biases and
it is best to focus on the varieties of populism both in terms of form and intensity. But how does
this relate specifically to “Global Strategy in the Age of Skepticism of Globalization” and to busi-
ness and public policy? To fashion a first attempt at addressing this issue, and also to show how
the “Varieties of Populism” logic applies in specific cases, we discuss three key areas of global
strategy and international business and how they are reflected in individual cases of populist
leaders and populist parties: Globalization (e.g., foreign direct investment, tariffs, and trade),
Immigration, and Multilateralism (i.e., attitudes toward supra-national authority). While we
could expand this list further (and plan to in the future), we feel that what is presented is quite
broad and captures key areas of the intersection of populist agendas and globalization.
Using these three areas, Table 3 includes the specific policy positions of a variety of populist
political leaders and their parties. We have chosen to do this so that the link between the form
and style of populism given in Table 3 can be seen in terms of its implications for policy and
practice. Hence, we also present (where available) information on “openness to trade” and “atti-
tudes to immigration” for the countries where, and at the time, those leaders were (or are) in
power. What we see very clearly shows the sort of heterogeneity that our “Varieties of Popu-
lism” logic implies. Overall, there is nothing that could be called a “global” populist agenda and
populists are as likely to differ from one another as any other political leader is to differ from
one another, whether democratic or autocratic.
4.1.1 | Immigration
Perhaps the most commonly held view is that populists are anti-immigrant and that what drives
a lot of their political power is an anti-foreigner platform. However, the reality is that of 12 cases
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given in Table 3, a slight majority (7) promote a clear anti-immigrant agenda, with the
remaining five either neutral or pro-immigration or have no clear policy. So, while we do see
strong anti-immigrant rhetoric in the case of many high-profile populists such as Donald
J. Trump, Narendra Modi, and Viktor Orbán, this is not the case with many of the others. For
example, while Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, and Evo Morales might periodically use foreigners
as a whipping point or to promote nationalist, ethnic or regional policies, the reality is that the
laws of their countries and the policies being applied do not reflect anti-immigrant bias. This is
even the case where the sentiment toward immigrants is quite strongly or moderately negative,
as in Russia or the Philippines, or generally positive or neutral, as in the United States. Indeed,
this anti-immigration stance is potentially the most common historic force seen in more popu-
list rhetoric, being seen as very strong in the United States in the late 18th and early 19th Cen-
tury in even mainstream political parties.
4.1.2 | Mulilateralism
If we look at these leaders/parties and their view on multilateral institutions, we again see a
varied mix of positions. In fact, the overwhelming majority of the 12 examples are multilat-
eralist even if they impose some constraints on their multilateralism. Hence, the unilateral-
ist perspective that one sees in the case of the United States is more another example of a
general position of American exceptionalism being pushed further to the extreme of unilat-
eralism for political benefit. The larger powers, China, Russia, and India, promote multilat-
eralism but are effectively doing it, to some degree collectively, to counter the power of the
United States. The smaller powers are generally moderately to strongly multilateralist, par-
ticularly if they are leading a government; for example, Winston Peter's unilateralist convic-
tions do not really influence policy of his current more politically dominant coalition
partners. Like their positions on immigration, many of their views of supra national institu-
tions is pragmatic and focused on the value of that multilateralism for their local socio-
political agendas.
4.1.3 | Globalization
Finally, when we view these leaders/parties on their position with respect to globalization
we do see a degree of skepticism and push back, although, again, there are exceptions. Per-
haps the two most clear examples of open globalists are Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines
and Silvio Berlusconi (when in power). In the case of Xi Jinping, it is clearly a case of “Glob-
alization with Chinese Characters” as the agenda is related mainly to expansion of Chinese
influence vis-à-vis the United States. In most other cases, there is either strong traditional
left-wing sentiment toward globalization (Evo Morales, Robert Mugabe) or a tendency to
restrict globalization as a threat to key sectors or jobs (Trump, Peron, Modi, Orbán). How-
ever, when we relate this to the degree to which the country is open to foreign investment
and the ease of doing business, the matching is tenuous. For example, Italy, Hungary, and
Italy all fall under the European Union trading regime and are quite constrained on what
they can restrict. Other countries are either good, bad, or plain ugly when it comes to their
openness to trade and investment, a distribution generally unrelated to their current populist
regime.
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4.2 | Convergence and divergence
In sum, when looked at collectively, we see significant heterogeneity in the major populist polit-
ical agendas. Where they are more coherent is perhaps in what they oppose—political and busi-
ness elites, established political structures, and the vaguely and situationally defined “others.”
Beyond that, they are not, and should not be viewed as, a coherent global “movement” except
when circumstances make it convenient. While they may be against UN policies, these coun-
tries remain part of the UN. While these populists may be anti-elitist, they are still part of the
G-7 and G20 elite groups of countries. What they are, and what is critical, are global skeptics.
The generally do not buy into the automatic belief at the core of IB and global strategy thinking
that globalization is both force for, and enhanced and enabled by, positive social, economic and
political development.
Driving the populist surge has been a simple extrapolation of the local onto the global, as
there has been not just an upheaval in the mixture of socio-political demands by large swathes
of their population but a mapping of these demands onto (and interacting with) specific
national institutions. This reality calls into the question Drezner's (2009) thesis about the power
of large states to drive global regulatory change and policy standardization, as well as
Ramamurti's (2005) thesis as to the convergence of regulatory structures. Drezner's thesis that
all “politics is global” has been challenged by the anti-thesis of individuals like former Speaker
of the U.S. House of Representatives Tip O'Neill (O'Neill & Hymel, 1994), who famously
proclaimed that “all politics is local.” While the last several decades reflected a resolution that
was dominated more by the logic of the thesis, we see in the last several years a rise of the anti-
thesis and the globalization of the local. This is reflected in Butzbach, Fuller, and Schnyder
(2020) argument that local backlash with respect to globalization's effects on local constituen-
cies can lead to pressure to engage in policy reversals, even in the face of the constraints of
regional and global agreements.
For managers and policy makers in many countries, this reality may require a revisiting of
the past, when globalization was less about global platforms and more about integration of dis-
parate operations. It may also imply that “global factory” models are overstating what is realis-
tic in today's political reality and that conceptions of the global value chain have been revealed
to be missing a crucial element of risk, especially if value chains are susceptible to being weap-
onized for political purposes. In addition, as seen with the Belt and Road initiative from China,
the interdependencies created by state-linked multinational networks and infrastructure can be
a vector of political power that put countries at risk, rather than countries being a vector of
political power that put firms at risk. Hence, it may not be that new theories are needed, but
that the balance of interests implies that theories once thought less relevant will need to be
revisited; moreover, the Theory of the Multinational Corporation will need to emphasize more
of the local adaptation character of the multinational rather than its global integration charac-
ter. As we have stressed in this paper, the design of political and economic institutions may also
become narrower or more nationally focused, meaning that businesses will need to exhibit
greater levels of strategic agility, improvisation, and adaptation across countries in order to
remain relevant. In this regard, Marano, Tallman, and Teegan's (2020) notion of “Liability of
Disruption” becomes important as it implies that what matters is how MNE's establish legiti-
macy in an environment that is not accepting of the structural change that their business
models would trigger.
In addition, the general negative view of immigration seen in nearly all of the more populist
parties and leaders has implications for the free movement of skills and talent. Brexit is perhaps
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the most extreme case since it reflects an example where a country (the United Kingdom) is
purposely turning its back on freedom of movement for its own citizens (abrogating the ability
of United Kingdom citizens to work in the EU freely) in order to stop EU citizens from having
that same right in the United Kingdom. What this policy does is isolate labor, strongly changing
the dynamic of knowledge-based systems that rely on the movement of people and talent and a
key part of global multinational strategy and performance (see, e.g., Andersson, Forsgren, &
Holm, 2002). Ultimately, it is unclear the extent to which such changes will affect “embedded”
subsidiaries and the trade-off between outsourced activities and the internalization of more of
the global value chain in proximate locations. However, as Buckley and Hashai (2020) show, as
the cost of operating the components of a global value chain change, this alters the local and
control structures of the MNE's network.
For policy, the importance of local concerns and their impact on national-level institutions
may imply that the ability to engage in mutually beneficial resolution of global and regional
agreements will become more difficult. In particular, as local political heterogeneity rises to the
fore and local politicians cater more directly to their constituencies, broader coalitions are less
likely and favorable economic policies which rely on these coalitions (such as free trade) can
become scarcer. Policymakers must attempt to resist this siren's song of localization while con-
tinuing to press for broad-based policies which can deliver economic growth; however, in order
to forestall further anti-elite sentiment, a welcome development will also be to reverse the con-
sistent centralization of policymaking and return power to sub-national units via real decentral-
ization. By once again properly delineating responsibilities between national and sub-national
authorities, adhering to a subsidiarity principle which has been de facto abandoned,
policymakers stand a better chance of pushing economic reforms while keeping recalcitrant
political institutions in check. From the business standpoint, it may be more difficult in dealing
with different regions of a country with their own business flavor, but it could be preferable to
being shut out of the country entirely due to an ascendant populism.
What we also see is that most populist parties have something of a “beggar thy neighbor”
approach to international relations that creates a potential prisoner's dilemma in terms of their
approach to globalization in general. Hence, it may not be a coincidence that rise of populist
parties in one country has a contagion effect on other countries, leading to tit-for-tat style policies
such as the trade policies of the 1930s or, more recently, in the ongoing China–U.S. trade war.
While we know that globalization and de-globalization operate continuously and side by side
(Benito, 2005), the driver has mostly been MNEs making adjustments to a global portfolio of
operations based on technological development, market evolution, and asset prices. A more pop-
ulist political stance adds in localization for political purposes more strongly into that equation, a
reality that may need to be re-incorporated into our models of location and investment choice.
4.3 | Managing in an age of populism
Overall, we can look back to Table 1 and our dimensional definition of populism and relate it
clearly to the major drivers of global strategy. Countries with more populist influence will exhibit
more pressure (a) for favored factors of production, putting emphasis on local over global value
chains, (b) for ownership structures that reflect capturing the rents for political purposes, (c) to
identify or use corporate structures to further the populist agenda, and (d) on existing long stand-
ing corporate and political networks that have driven policy in the past. What this implies is a
need on the part of companies to skew their decision-making away from old realities to new
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realities that de-emphasize global benefits from global activities and emphasize the local and dis-
tributional characteristics of the MNEs operations. Perhaps this requires a redefinition of the
adage “Think Global, Act Local” to something more of the line “Think Global, Be Local”.
We can address the issue of the management of local and global firms in this environment
more specifically on three dimensions of impact that go back to early work on political risk mit-
igation (e.g., de la Torre & Neckar, 1988; Kobrin, 1982; Ring, Lenway, & Govekar, 1990),
namely transfer/transactional risk, operational risk, and ownership/control risk. Transfer/trans-
actional risk is associated with the uncertainty surrounding flows to and from the company
from outside the country in question. These might include repatriation of profits, technology,
people, and so on. Operational risk is associated with the constraints on the physical operations
of the company, such as environmental regulations, worker regulations, pressure toward local
content, etc. Ownership/Control risk is associated with expropriation of all or a portion of the
ownership of the company or the proprietary assets such as technology, patents, and so on, or
other pressures to skew decision making outcome in more alignment with political goals. So,
the question that arises for companies is “what is at risk and what is the form of risk engen-
dered by the populist agenda?” As we have seen, empirical evidence shows that countries with
more populist governments do skew resources and rents toward more excluded parts of the
society and this arises via restrictions at span all three risk categories.
The means for countering or mitigating these risks is many and varied but generally fall into
three categories: forecasting, forestalling and absorption/internalization. Forecasting is literally
what it says and is usually considered to the precursor of decisions to forestall or absorb. Per-
haps the clearest case where forecasting has been a major issue has been Brexit. The failure of
the political institutions to achieve a predictable Brexit outcome (and actual exit date), has
wreaked havoc across many business sectors, particularly when it comes to future investment
commitments. Faced with an ability to make informed decisions has forced many companies to
work to worst case scenarios. Forestalling is the structuring of the company and its strategic dis-
position to control the emergence of unpredictable events. This can show up in outward FDI
that diversifies operations and sourcing externally (such as many car companies choosing to
move operations from the United Kingdom when facing Brexit), pro-active public relations
(such as engaging in alignment with the clear stakeholder groups), political lobbying, and stra-
tegic disposition or reputation signaling (such as credible exchange of threats as seen in the
U.S.–China trade-war). The key to forestalling is to make it more costly to the local risk source
to engage in behavior antithetical to the best interests of the corporation. The third approach is
absorption, which is akin to internalization. It is the internalization of political risk through the
structure of the company vis-a-vis the sources of the risk. Absorption can have many of the
characteristics of forestalling and include actions such as joint ventures (particularly with
parties that might be aligned to the new populist elite), pre-emptive FDI (thereby increasing the
dependence of the local economy on your actions), and either more vertical integration thereby
reducing the openness of transactional operations. Like forestalling, absorption is aimed at
merging interests between those causing the risks and those facing them.
As with all corporate mechanisms, there is no free lunch. The use of forestalling and absorp-
tion is difficult because the ability to reduce one type of risk (e.g., transfer risk is reduced
through country diversification) can lead to circumstances where the vulnerability to another
(e.g., ownership risk might be increased because the costs of expropriation are low) is increased.
What this implies is that managing in an age of populism is not much different than managing
in other eras, except that the mixture of risks and tools changes as the circumstances and indi-
viduals wielding political power change.
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In Table 4 we replicate Table 1 but focus on the implications for three types of firms: local
firms, local based MNEs and global, non-local based, MNEs. We then ask the question what
strategy is likely to be more dominant (rather than asking what is “best” when such an
TABLE 4 Examples of populist policies and specific implications for global strategy
Variety of
populism
Relevance for
strategy
Implications for local firms
Implications for
multinational firmsDomestic Home MNEs
Structural Emphasis on
favored factors of
production, stress
on local and
domestic value
chains
Utilize local
positioning to
capture rents
from MNEs
Pressure to localize
international
operations or to
consider global
operations as less
integrated with
local operations
Pressure to localize.
Absorption/
internalization and
forestalling
approximately equal.
Main risk is transactional
and operational, but some
ownership is at risk due
to rent extraction
Economic Review of
investment
policies under
uncertainty,
proactive policies
to avoid possible
nationalization,
diversification of
value chains
Could lose links to
global value
chains as links to
local value chains
more critical
Potential de-
globalizing
pressures leading
to more need to
internalize local
operations
Emphasize the local
contributions of the MNE
to local stakeholders.
Distribute rents more
broadly geographically
and into more deprived
areas of the economy and
country. Forestalling
dominates. Main risk is
transactional and
operational, but
ownership is more at risk
due potential of
nationalization
Ideological Need for strategic
flexibility
depending on
variety of
populism
Alignment to local
political
philosophy
viewed as
beneficial but
cost is relatively
low.
Potential conflict
with local
political
philosophy
having spillover
to global
operations.
Potential of divestment to
the extent that the
ideological positioning is
contrary to global
philosophy.
Alternatives include total
local market adaptation
or divestment
Absorption/internalization
dominates if choice is to
remain in country.
Ownership risk very high
Political–
Institutional
Need to cultivate
new political
connections,
serve new
demographics
Firm will be more
of an instrument
of the state
Pressure to export
local political
philosophy as
well as goods and
services – Firm
could be quasi
state controlled
Localization pressures very
strong as well as re-
alignment of local
operations. Scale required
with absorption/
internalization pressure
very strong
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evaluation will be highly contingent on the firms and country in question) and where the risk
resides. The clearest difference is between the first two rows and the last two rows. As one
moves down the table, we see that operational and transfer/transaction risks will decline rela-
tively speaking and ownership risks will rise. What this implies is that the form of populism,
particularly to the extent that it is “ideological” or more long term and all encompassing—as is
the case with “political-institutional” populism—the more likely it is that the firm's control of
not just its operations but its ownership and control are at risk. Perhaps the most extreme exam-
ple of this is the populism of Xi Jinping, where CCP control of local firms has become signifi-
cant while the impact externally has forced many firms to rethink their China operations and
their interaction with China. This forces more extreme decisions onto the firms, either local or
global. In the case of softer forms of populism, seen in the case of “economic” and “structural”
varieties, firms find themselves in a situation where the traditional mechanisms of forestalling
and absorption/internalization have value and what we see is simply a movement of rent
extraction toward local operations and local resources. For the local MNE, this is perhaps the
most difficult position to be in as they are bringing residual value back into the country from
foreign operations but this is seen as a substitute for local operations that force it to be more like
its past—when it was local—and less like its potential future—which is global.
For the MNE there is actually more variety of choice of reaction depending on the form of
populism they are facing, which can be seen by the fact that there are distinct responses to each
form of populism. Structural forms of populism lead to pressure to localize for localization's
sake with more emphasis on things like local employment. Economic forms of populism are
related to spreading benefits more broadly, which might be forestalled with tax or infrastructure
payments rather than physical assets. In some ways these are the least worrying as MNE's can
make marginal decisions that simply re-orient production or operations. More of a concern are
ideological and political-institutional forms of populism, that are likely to drive divestment or
lead to a lack of FDI in the first place. It is these forms that require more radical decision mak-
ing and can lead to the complete exclusion of a country from the MNE's portfolio of activities.
Ultimately, our approach implies that what is critical to understanding the varieties of popu-
lism is to not focus on the institutional structures in a manner akin to Hall and Soskice (2001)
but to concentrate more on the philosophic and political positions of the political agents. In
addition, for Hall and Soskice the goal was rather singular as noted in their subtitle: The Insti-
tutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Our approach comes closer to Ambrose
Beirce's definition of politics in The Devil's Dictionary as “The conduct of public affairs for pri-
vate advantage” where that “private advantage” relates to the economic, social and political
goals that are the aim of political activity. What this implies for firms is that their political
intelligence—their “forecasting” in the parlance of this section—is critical as without an under-
stand of the “why” of the political actors it becomes impossible to determine the “what” should
be done in response.
5 | CONCLUSION
Our purpose in this article was not to make a value judgment about the morality of populism or
speculate on the importance of populism for the globalization agenda, as this has been amply
done by others. As Mudambi (2018) posits, the recent rise of populism in the Western democra-
cies could simply be due to the conditions normally seen in less-developed environments being
replicated in the West It may also be that surge in populism is due, in part, to the structural
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force of neoliberalism and the “continued pain” it inflicts. However, we would argue that eco-
nomic disruption is constant and does not always result in populism ascending. Indeed, closer
to Mudambi's (2018) argument, populism would be given an outlet if economic disruption
occurs and it does not lead to greater allocative efficiency (i.e. the promise of neoliberal
reforms). Instead, we have attempted to ask what the rise of populism in the early part of the
21st century implies regarding how we as researchers should think about the effects of political
institutions and personalities and (crucially) how we can understand and model them in global
strategy research. Our conclusion is that the events of the last decade call into question whether
the form and depth of inquiry in which we engage regarding institutional structures is appropri-
ate for many issues we observe in global strategy.
In particular, we believe that crucial aspects of the institutional environment have thus far
been ignored in much of the international business literature, due mainly to the difficulties of
quantifying these aspects but also due to an acceptance of institutional structures as exogenous.
While much of what we have studied in international business at the macro-institutional level
is subjected to the normal level of academic skepticism, the rise of populism implies that we
need to be broadening both our theoretical logics and empirical models of institutions and
understanding their endogeneity. Such an approach would entail expanding our gaze to a more
cross-disciplinary horizon, drawing on insights not only from economics but political science,
psychology, sociology, and the humanities.
Indeed, an approach which draws more on political science, psychology, and other disci-
plines could be incredibly beneficial for understanding business strategy, as it would force us to
reorient our analysis down from the god's eye/macro view to a much more micro-focused
understanding of institutions and institutional structures. As we have demonstrated in this
paper, a missing element from much of our understanding of institutions is precisely this
micro-level analysis, and the largest gap is also the most micro unit of all, that of the individual.
Overall, we need to be more practical in our thinking with respect to the role of political actors
and personalities, and how who is involved in institutional evolution or functioning can influ-
ence of policy and thus outcomes. To date, research in international business and, to a lesser
extent, new institutional economics has implied that it does not matter who is appointed, elec-
ted, or heading a specific institution. As recent reality and the wave of populism has shown, this
may not be a valid assumption.
While at one level, we are calling for a microfoundational approach to looking at the nature
of political institutional structures, we are also calling for a multi-level time dependent perspec-
tive as well. This represents an opportunity for the field of global strategy. For example, in the
introduction to the recent special issue of the Global Strategy Journal on “The Micro-
foundations of Global Strategy,” Contractor, Foss, Kundu, and Lahiri (2019), echo our view-
points about the dominance of specific levels of analysis in our literature. For them, major
issues relate to the decisions being made by the firm and its managers and the papers in that
special issue mostly retain the logics that have dominated work in areas such as upper echelon
theory. However, we believe that a broader and more ambitious perspective should be encour-
aged. This would benefit global strategy field by concentrating just a bit more on the reality of
decision making and the complex interactions that go on between firms, managers, politicians,
and other stakeholders. This will require potential changes to the mix of research methods, per-
haps relying more on detailed social network approaches that track corporate political interac-
tions and historical analysis of repetitions of single country contexts over time. All of these
different approaches are likely to enrich our understanding by expanding the boundaries of our
field and its theories.
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Finally, from a more practical business and policy perspective, we believe that many of our
existing theories and approaches do have resonance in an “Age of Skepticism of Globalization.”
As we noted, there is much we can learn more from the socio-political changes we are
experiencing, however, we can also apply old models that still have general applicability. For
example, the rise of populist political parties is requiring firms to rebalance the benefits of
global integration versus the benefits of local responsiveness as the political pressures have
made globalization gains more costly (Devinney, Midgley, & Venaik, 2000). However, unlike
Buckley and Hashai (2020), we do not believe this is heralding a new global system. Similarly,
the value of corporate political action does not disappear because the nature of political and
country risks and the holders of power change and the power of the state increases relative to
that of the multinational. As noted by Boddewyn (2016): 20) “[t]he early concept of ‘political
risk’ remains the dominant one that keeps assuming new guises… [T]he obsolescing-bargain
theory remains the dominant interpretation of a foreign investor's fluctuating bargaining power
when facing political risk … [M]ultilateralism seems no longer attainable in the foreseeable
future”. In this regard, we conclude by echoing Boddewyn's (2016: 21) conclusion that “such
weighty issues cannot simply rely on secondary data but will also require ‘contextual
intelligence’.”
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